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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PERSONALIZING INFORMED CONSENT:
THE CHALLENGE OF HEALTH LITERACY

I. INTRODUCTION
The legal doctrine of informed consent does not adequately consider an
individual patient’s literacy—in particular health literacy.1 Considering the
level of a patient’s health literacy is an essential part of the ongoing
communication required for obtaining genuinely informed consent. It also
influences whether the patient was subjectively informed and understood the
terms of the consent. If informed consent is to properly represent a patient’s
knowledge and understanding of risks, then health literacy must be
considered.
The traditional roles of the patient and physician are changing as
emerging health policies and processes place a greater burden on patients
to acquire and process health information and data.2 In particular, patient
literacy is increasingly important with the advent of consumer-directed
healthcare (CDHC) and personal health records (PHR).3 Supporters of
CDHC believe that under this model of care there will be shared decision
making between physicians and patients.4 If this is the case, patients clearly
1. See infra notes 18-28 and accompanying text (discussing definitions for health
literacy).
2. See Jamie Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The
Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 431 (2006).
3. Consumer-directed health plans couple catastrophic health insurance coverage with
large deductibles. CDHC aims at patients taking more responsibility for their own health and
health care, by additional cost sharing, researching, and selecting providers, relying on health
information from alternative sources (websites) and maintaining of personal health records.
See id. at 487 (noting that patients increasingly have more of a role in treatment and medical
decisions). See generally TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE
CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT 17-26, 119-49 (2007) (discussing how CDHC can mold
patients into better health care consumers and increase overall value of health care through
the increase of patient cost sharing obligations; also discussing how cost sharing can force
patients to be more selective in choosing a provider); Jane Root & Sue Stableford, Easy-toRead Consumer Communications: A Missing Link in Medicaid Managed Care, 24 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 1, 2 (1999) (discussing how patients must now take more responsibility for
their health and health care); Nicolas P. Terry, Personal Health Records: Directing More Costs
and Risks to Consumers?, 1 DREXEL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
4. See Linda M. Axtell-Thompson, Consumer Directed Health Care: Ethical Limits to
Choice and Responsibility, 30 J. MED. & PHIL. 207, 224 (2005); compare King & Moulton,
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need to be health literate to effectively share in the decision making process.
Critics of CDHC suggest that this model puts patients at more risk financially
and in regards to treatment decisions.5 Thus, patients’ health literacy is
important if they are to understand the risks of treatment options.
Whichever way consumer directed healthcare is viewed, literacy becomes
more of a factor than it was under the traditional model of healthcare
delivery. Patients are involved more in healthcare processes that require
literacy, yet patient literacy should not be assumed.6
This Comment identifies inadequate patient health literacy as a barrier
to obtaining genuine informed consent that is not adequately taken into
account by the legal system. Genuine informed consent requires patient
understanding of disclosures of risks.7 Proper legal consideration of patient
health literacy can be accomplished through a re-evaluation of the legal
standards of disclosure, and/or statutory changes to the requirements of
informed consent forms, and/or the requirements of disclosure
communication. The legal doctrine of informed consent is rich in rhetoric of
individual autonomy, yet only on rare occasions have the courts addressed
patient literacy when examining the validity of informed consent.8 This
Comment argues that the ethical justifications for informed consent can be
used to strengthen the argument for modifying the legal standards for
informed consent so that patient health literacy is adequately taken into
account.
The standard for determining the adequacy of a patient’s informed
consent depends on the legal jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions adequacy is
determined by the reasonable physician standard, also called the
professional custom standard.9 This is the legal (not ethical) customs of the
profession.
The reasonable physician standard is influenced by
accreditation standards (the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) and the American Board of Medical
Specialties (ABMS)), regulations (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS)), and the American Medical Association (AMA). In other jurisdictions,
adequacy is determined by what a “reasonable” patient expects and/or
needs to know.10 In the ethical domain, genuine informed consent is often
viewed as the result of a continuing discussion between physician and
supra note 2, at 487 (arguing that shared decision making is necessary due to the increased
role of consumerism in health care).
5. See Axtell-Thompson, supra note 4, at 225 (discussing that if the CDHC is badly
executed, the results could be severe, including “cost shifting rather than cost efficiency”).
6. See infra Part II (discussing patient literacy).
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
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patient, and is justified by the patient’s right of autonomy and selfdetermination.11 Adequate consideration of patient health literacy is
arguably required under the ethical theories of informed consent, including
those based on individual autonomy, the waiver of epistemic and ethical
norms, and shared decision making.12 The reasonable patient standard
currently provides the best opportunity to advocate for consideration of
health literacy in informed consent litigation. The best option for improving
the quality of informed consent of patients with varying levels of health
literacy may be to pass state legislation that addresses the process of
consent and the readability level of consent forms.
Part II of this Comment begins with an examination of the current
literature on general literacy and health literacy of Americans and concludes
that inadequate health literacy is a pervasive problem in the United States,
health literacy is difficult to accurately measure, and patient illiteracy leads
to poor health outcomes. Part III describes the basics of the legal doctrine
of informed consent, emphasizing the competing standards for the scope of
disclosure—the reasonable physician standard and the reasonable patient
standard. The discussion of the legal doctrine is followed by a brief
discussion of the ethical perspectives of informed consent, and whether
health literacy is consistent with ethical requirements for obtaining genuine
informed consent. Part IV explores how literacy affects consent and focuses
largely on the readability of informed consent forms. Part V discusses health
literacy and the legal informed consent doctrine by analyzing current case
law, identifying potential barriers to an increased recognition of the
importance of health literacy in achieving legally valid informed consent,
identifying potential avenues to increase the consideration of health literacy,
and reviewing initiatives that have been implemented to address health
literacy in the context of informed consent. This Comment concludes by
summarizing the key findings and making recommendations for advocacy
approaches to improve the quality of informed consent through recognition
of the inadequate health literacy levels of patients.
II. GENERAL LITERACY AND HEALTH LITERACY
In the United States, approximately twenty-one percent of the adult
population has low literacy skills, defined as “reading at the sixth grade level
or below,” and “twenty-seven percent may have limited literacy ability,
defined as lacking general reading and numeracy proficiency to function
adequately in society.”13 Therefore, nearly half of the adult population has
11. See infra Part III.B.
12. See infra notes 88-91, 94-99, 102-03 and accompanying text.
13. David I. Shalowitz & Michael S. Wolf, Shared Decision-Making and the Lower Literate
Patient, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 759, 759 (2004).
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deficiencies in reading and/or computational skills.14 Low literacy is
associated with poor patient “understanding of written or spoken medical
advice, adverse health outcomes, and negative effects on the health of the
population.”15 Low literacy among patients has been described as a “silent
epidemic” because physicians and other healthcare providers are often
unaware of their patients’ low literacy.16 The average adult in the United
States reads at an Eighth or Ninth grade level, and the average Medicaid
patient reads at a Fifth grade level.17 Health literacy may be significantly
worse than general literacy since literacy is context specific and medical
information can be full of unfamiliar vocabulary (medical jargon) and
concepts.18 Health literacy skills include all the traditional literacy skills
(reading and writing), plus several additional or enhanced skill sets, such as,
knowledge of common health-related vocabulary, abbreviations, and how
the healthcare system works.19 Thus, patients who have low general literacy
also have low health literacy, but patients with low health literacy include
some patients who do not have low general literacy. It has been estimated
that approximately ninety million Americans have low health literacy.20
The 2003 National Assessment of Adult Literacy (NAAL) was the first
large-scale assessment to measure health literacy in the United States.21
The NAAL functional definition of health literacy is “[t]he ability to
comprehend and use printed and written health information to function in
society, to achieve one’s goals, and to develop one’s knowledge and

14. Ad Hoc Comm. on Health Literacy for the Council on Scientific Affairs, Am. Med.
Ass’n, Health Literacy: Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs, 281 JAMA 552, 552 (1999)
[hereinafter Ad Hoc Comm., Health Literacy].
15. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, LITERACY AND HEALTH OUTCOMES:
SUMMARY 1, 1 (2004), available at www.ahrq.gov/clinic/epcsums/litsum.pdf (last visited Apr.
16, 2009) [hereinafter AHRQ REPORT].
16. Erin N. Marcus, The Silent Epidemic — The Health Effects of Illiteracy, 355 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 339, 340 (2006); see Jennifer Fisher Wilson, The Crucial Link Between Literacy and
Health, 139 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 875, 875-76 (2003) (examining the incredibly low levels
of health literacy in the United States).
17. JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., PATIENTS AS PARTNERS: HOW
TO INVOLVE PATIENTS AND FAMILIES IN THEIR OWN CARE 72 (Meghan McGreevey ed., 2006)
[hereinafter PATIENTS AS PARTNERS]; see also Root & Stableford, supra note 3, at 5 (reporting
“that nearly half of all adults read at the eighth grade level or below[,]” and that “[s]eventy-five
percent of welfare recipients read at this same low level.”).
18. Ad Hoc Comm., Health Literacy, supra note 14.
19. SHEIDA WHITE, ASSESSING THE NATION’S HEALTH LITERACY: KEY CONCEPTS AND FINDINGS
OF THE NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ADULT LITERACY (NAAL) 22 (2008), available at www.amaassn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/367/hl_report_2008.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2009).
20. Jillanne M. Schulte, Health Literacy: Closing the Communication Gap Between
Doctors and Patients, HUM. RTS., Fall 2007 at 18, 18.
21. WHITE, supra note 19, at 3.
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potential.”22
The report states that “health literacy measures the
comprehension and use of printed health-related prose and documents and
performance on arithmetic operations using health-related information
embedded in a text.”23 The assessment reported results in four performance
levels: Below Basic, Basic, Intermediate, and Proficient.24 On the 2003
NAAL, twenty-two percent of adults scored at the Basic level in health
literacy and fourteen percent were at the Below Basic level.25
According to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ),
health literacy is “a constellation of skills that constitute the ability to perform
basic reading and numerical tasks for functioning in the health care
environment and acting on health care information.”26 Healthy People
2010, a policy report of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, defined health literacy as “[t]he degree to which individuals have
the capacity to obtain, process, and understand basic health information
and services needed to make appropriate health decisions.”27 Health
literacy, according to the Institute of Medicine (IOM), “is a shared function
of cultural, social, and individual factors.”28 For the purposes of this
Comment, health literacy is defined as the possession of reading, writing,
and communication skills that enable patients to obtain, process, and
understand health information and services needed to make informed health
decisions.
While there is no universally accepted definition of health literacy or way
to measure health literacy, several organizations have developed models for
evaluating health literacy. The NAAL, discussed supra, tested health literacy
by measuring comprehension of “printed or written health-related materials
and performance on arithmetic operations using health-related information

22. Id.
23. Id. at 22.
24. Id. at 3, 33 tbl.4 (“Below Basic indicates a grasp of no more than the simplest, most
concrete literacy skills,” for example, “[s]igning a form.” “Basic indicates skills needed to
perform simple everyday literacy activities,” including “[e]ntering names and birth dates in a
health insurance application.” “Intermediate indicates skills necessary to perform moderately
challenging literacy activities,” such as, “[c]onsulting reference materials to determine which
foods contain a particular vitamin.” “Proficient indicates skills necessary to perform more
complex and challenging literacy activities,” for example “[i]nterpreting a table about blood
pressure, age, and physical activity.”).
25. Id. at 43.
26. AHRQ REPORT, supra note 15, at 1.
27. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Understanding and Improving Health, in 1
HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010, at 11-20 (2000), available at www.healthypeople.gov/Document/pdf/
Volume1/11HealthCom.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2009) [hereinafter HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010].
28. COMM. ON HEALTH LITERACY, INST. OF MED., HEALTH LITERACY: A PRESCRIPTION TO END
CONFUSION 32 (Lynn Nielsen-Bohlman et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter IOM].
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imbedded in text.”29 The NAAL identified three types of health literacy tasks:
The NAAL did not measure
clinical, preventive, and navigation.30
“knowledge of health issues” or “understanding of medical jargons”,
“scientific terms and symbols”, and “[s]kills associated with listening,
speaking, and nonverbal communication.”31 The variables that were not
measured would be useful in evaluating how health literacy impacts
informed consent, because standard informed consent forms are often full
of medical jargons, and scientific terms and symbols. Also, informed
consent is theoretically an ongoing communication process in which
listening and speaking skills are crucial. If a signed consent form is used
merely as evidence that a conversation between the patient and physician
took place, then listening, speaking, and nonverbal communication skills
are essential parts of the informed consent process. Thus, while the NAAL is
useful for obtaining a general understanding of health literacy, it lacks
important measures of health literacy that relate to a patient’s ability to give
informed consent.
Since the NAAL first introduced the health literacy questions as an aspect
of its assessment in 2003, there have been numerous attempts by others to
measure health literacy. Two popular measures of health literacy among
researchers are the Test of Functional Health Literacy in Adults (TOFHLA)
and the Rapid Estimate of Adult Literacy in Medicine (REALM).32
The reading comprehension portion of the TOFHLA involves common
materials used in healthcare settings, including standard informed consent
forms.33 A patient is deemed to have inadequate or low literacy if they
answer fewer than half of the TOFHLA questions correctly.34 This means
they may have difficulty reading “pill bottle labels, appointment slips,

29.
30.
31.
32.

WHITE, supra note 19, at 7 (emphasis removed).
Id.
Id.
Wilson, supra note 16, at 875. But see RIMA RUDD ET AL., LITERACY AND HEALTH IN
AMERICA 3-20 (2004), available at www.ets.org/Media/Research/pdf/PICHEATH.pdf (last
visited Apr. 16, 2009) (discussing another method of measuring health literacy—the “Health
Activities Literacy Scale” (HALS)). Introduced in 2004, the HALS emphasizes the importance of
the interaction between the complexity of health material and what individuals are expected to
do with the material, instead of focusing only on the structure and complexity of written or
printed texts. Id. at 3, 17. Approximately 12% of the U.S. adult population is estimated to
have Level 1 skills on the HALS and “an additional 7% can be expected to have great difficulty
performing even these simple tasks with a high [level] of proficiency” (level 2: 27%; level 3:
36%; level 4: 17%; level 5: 1%). Id. at 3, 20 fig.3. The HALS identified the following skills as
essential for adults to have health literacy: document reading skills, specific types of writing
skills for completing forms, math skills, presentation skills, a descriptive vocabulary, and
listening and speaking skills. Id. at 42.
33. Wilson, supra note 16, at 875.
34. Id.
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educational brochures, informed[]consent forms,” and other health
information.35 “TOFHLA takes up to 22 minutes to administer.”36 Based on
the results of TOFHLA patients are placed in one of three categories:
inadequate health literacy, marginal health literacy, or adequate health
literacy.37 Even patients classified as having adequate health literacy may
have difficulty understanding complex informed consent forms.38
The REALM test measures a patient’s health literacy based on their
ability to read and pronounce medical words from three lists of twenty-two
words each.39 The number of words that the patient reads and pronounces
correctly from each list determines their health literacy.40 The words range
in difficulty from “fat” and “eye” to “osteoporosis” and “impetigo.”41 The
REALM test can be performed quickly, in approximately three minutes,42
which makes it practical, but the test does not require that patients define
the medical words. Being able to read aloud a consent form is of little use if
a patient does not understand the words that they are reading.
Currently, there is no measure that accounts for all of the skills and
knowledge associated with health literacy.43 A model for evaluating health
literacy in patients would be most useful in the informed consent context if it
measures comprehension of excerpts from informed consent forms,
knowledge of health issues, understanding of medical and legal
terminology,44 scientific terms, and skills associated with listening, speaking,
and nonverbal communication. While there is no universally accepted
measure of health literacy, it is clear that health literacy is a factor for many
patients.
It is difficult for physicians and other healthcare providers to identify
patients with poor literacy skills.45 One reason for this difficulty is that

35. Id.
36. IOM, supra note 28, at 48.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 47-48, 302 tbl.C-1.
40. Id. at 48.
41. IOM, supra note 28, at 302 tbl.C-1.
42. Id. at 47.
43. Id. at 50; see also Mark Hochhauser, Liabilities of “Unreadable” Consent Forms, in
2005 SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS BOOK 115, 117 (Edward F. Gabriele & Valerie J. Ducker eds.,
2005), available at www-s.med.uiuc.edu/administration/research/resources/SRA/proceedings
.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2009) (stating there are no readability formulas developed
specifically for informed consent forms; “[t]hus, there is no data on the validity and reliability
of readability formulas for informed consent forms in [the] adult population.”).
44. This Comment is focused on health literacy, but complex informed consent forms may
also contain legal jargon/terminology, which could make it more difficult to understand the
form.
45. Marcus, supra note 16, at 340.
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patients are often ashamed and skilled at hiding their low literacy.46 It has
been suggested that as a universal precaution healthcare providers should
assume that all patients have low health literacy, whether or not they have
low general literacy skills.47 This precaution would be helpful to achieve
genuine informed consent from patients. If time is taken to explain the risks
that are being consented to verbally and/or informed consent forms are
written in plain language, then it is more likely that patients with low health
literacy will understand the risks and be able to give genuinely valid
informed consent.
The majority of adults in the United States with low literacy skills are
white and natural born citizens.48 Low literacy is most prevalent among the
elderly,49 persons with low cognitive ability, the less educated, lower
socioeconomic groups, the incarcerated, and persons of certain racial or
ethnic groups (minorities).50 A study conducted from 1993-1994 at two
urban public hospitals found that many patients could not comprehend
basic medical directions that contained numerical information.51 Research
has demonstrated that there is a relationship between low health literacy
and poor health status—low health literacy “may lead to poor [healthcare]
quality and excess medical services and costs.”52 A relationship has been
found between lower literacy skills and “a limited understanding of personal
health issues, infrequent use of preventive care services, delayed diagnosis,
poor adherence to treatment and medical instructions, inadequate disease
self-management skills, and higher health care costs.”53 Literacy skills have
been found to be a better predictor of health status than “age, income,
employment status, education level, and racial or ethnic group.”54
Inadequate health literacy is a pervasive problem in the United States. It
affects a wide variety of people and has been associated with poor health
outcomes. Health literacy is difficult to measure, and it is something that
patients are unlikely to volunteer to their physicians. Health literacy affects

46. Id.
47. Id. at 341.
48. PATIENTS AS PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 71.
49. Mark V. Williams et al., Inadequate Functional Health Literacy Among Patients at Two
Public Hospitals, 274 JAMA 1677, 1681 (1995); see also Julie A. Gazmararian et al., Health
Literacy Among Medicare Enrollees in a Managed Care Organization, 281 JAMA 545, 548
(1999) (finding in a study of Medicare enrollees that “more than one third of respondents had
inadequate or marginal health literacy.”).
50. AHRQ REPORT, supra note 15 at 1; Wilson, supra note 16, at 876.
51. Williams et al., supra note 49, at 1678-79.
52. Shoou-Yih D. Lee et al., Health Literacy, Social Support, and Health: A Research
Agenda, 58 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1309, 1316 (2004).
53. Shalowitz & Wolf, supra note 13, at 759 (internal citations omitted).
54. Wilson, supra note 16, at 875.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

PERSONALIZING INFORMED CONSENT

387

consent because it dictates how much of an informed consent conversation
and/or consent form is comprehended.
III. INFORMED CONSENT: THE LEGAL DOCTRINE AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES
The legal doctrine of informed consent has borrowed justifications from
ethics, such as autonomy and self-determination. There are two different
senses of informed consent: the autonomous authorization by individuals
and the social rules of consent, which includes legally valid consent.55 This
Section covers the basics of the legal doctrine of informed consent that
developed out of a judicial deference for autonomy.56 Noticeably absent
from the discussion of legal informed consent in the medical context is any
mention of health literacy. In the realm of ethics, autonomy, the waiver of
epistemic and ethical norms, and shared decision making have all been
proposed as the principles that support informed consent. Obtaining
genuinely informed consent from patients with low health literacy can be
accomplished by harmonizing legal informed consent doctrine with ethical
principles.
A.

Legal Doctrine

Under the common law doctrine of informed consent, physicians have a
duty to inform patients of material risks of a treatment or procedure and
alternative treatment options.57
Informed consent has developed out of strong judicial deference toward
individual autonomy, reflecting a belief that an individual has a right to be
free from nonconsensual interference with his or her person, and a basic
moral principle that it is wrong to force another to act against his or her
will.58

Courts do not usually consider whether the patient comprehended or was
able to comprehend the risk discussion or form as long as the patient is
generally competent.59 Legally recognized exceptions to informed consent
are cases of emergency, incompetency, waiver, and therapeutic privilege

55. Nicolas P. Terry, What’s Wrong with Health Privacy?, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES IN
BIOETHICS 68, 73-74 (Ana S. Iltis et al. eds., 2008) (citing TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 143-44 (4th ed. 1994)).
56. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 230 (6th ed.
2008).
57. Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371, 372-73 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
58. FURROW ET AL., supra note 56, at 230.
59. Id. at 244. Further, as of 2007, there were no “formal practice guidelines from
professional societies for the assessment of a patient’s capacity to consent to treatment.” Paul
S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment, 357 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1834, 1838 (2007).
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(the first three being non-controversial).60 While there is variability across
legal jurisdictions, in general, the legal standards for decision making
capacity “embody the abilities to communicate a choice, to understand the
relevant information, to appreciate the medical consequences of the
situation, and to reason about treatment choices.”61 From a clinical
perspective, “[v]alid informed consent is premised on the disclosure of
appropriate information to a competent patient who is permitted to make a
voluntary choice.”62 The duty of disclosure varies by jurisdiction—in some it
is “the medical standard of disclosure”, and in others it is the “degree of
disclosure sufficient to permit the ordinary patient to make a sound
decision.”63
The medical custom/reasonable physician (professional) standard of
informed consent looks at “what information a reasonable, prudent
physician would have disclosed to the patient under similar
circumstances.”64 The court in Natanson v. Kline articulated the reasonable
physician standard, but they also noted that the physician has an obligation
to “disclose and explain to the patient in language as simple as
necessary.”65 The physician has discretion as to what is necessary so long
as it is “consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to assure an
informed consent by the patient.”66 Twenty-three states use the reasonable
physician (professional) standard for disclosure in informed consent cases.67
The reasonable patient standard for the scope of disclosure looks at
what information would be material for a reasonable patient in similar
circumstances, and was articulated in Canterbury v. Spence.68 Under this
standard, valid consent results from “the informed exercise of a choice, and
that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available

60. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 124 (6th
ed. 2009).
61. Appelbaum, supra note 59, at 1835.
62. Id. at 1834.
63. Carl E. Schneider, Void for Vagueness, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 10,
10.
64. Marshall B. Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care:
Informed Consent and Informed Choice, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 91, 96 (2007); Natanson v. Kline,
350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960).
65. Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1106 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 1107.
67. David M. Studdert et al., Geographic Variation in Informed Consent Law: Two
Standards for Disclosure of Treatment Risks, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 103, 105, 106-09
fig.1, tbl.1 (2007) (stating that there are twenty-three states, however figure 1 and table 1
indicate twenty-two states in 2002).
68. Kapp, supra note 64, at 96-97; Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir.
1972); see also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972).
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and the risks attendant upon each.”69 Informed consent results from a
patient’s understanding of risks and alternative treatment options.70 The
physician has a duty of reasonable disclosure of material alternatives and
risks.71 The court rejected the majority view that the physician’s duty to
disclose is dependent upon the custom of physicians practicing in the
community.72 Instead, the prevailing medical practice has evidentiary value
but does not define the standard.73 The court set an objective standard for
material risks, holding that “‘[a] risk is . . . material when a reasonable
person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient’s
position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in
deciding whether or not to undergo the proposed therapy.’”74 In Cobbs v.
Grant, the Supreme Court of California justified the reasonable patient
standard in informed consent cases with the following postulates:
The first is that patients are generally persons unlearned in the medical
sciences and therefore, except in rare cases, courts may safely assume the
knowledge of patient and physician are not in parity. The second is that a
person of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of
control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful
medical treatment. The third is that the patient’s consent to treatment, to be
effective, must be an informed consent. And the fourth is that the patient,
being unlearned in medical sciences, has an abject dependence upon and
trust in his physician for the information upon which he relies during the

69. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780.
70. Id. at 780 n.15.
71. Id. at 782, 786-87.
72. Id. at 783.
73. Id. at 785.
74. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787 (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman,
Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 NW. U. L. REV. 628, 640 (1970)). The reasonable or
prudent patient standard has been criticized as rejecting “the centrality of the individual
patient, in all his or her particularity, and implicitly accepts the view that in any medical
choice-making situation, there can be only one ‘correct’ decision—not a range of possible
decisions, each potentially appropriate depending on the tastes, values, and trade offs among
conflicting values of the individual patient.” Alan J. Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law’s
Uneasy Compromise with Ethical Theory, 65 NEB. L. REV. 749, 760 (1986). One court
rejected the “objective standard for determining the causation issue” in informed consent
claims and adopted a subjective standard, “on [the] grounds that ‘no consideration is given to
the peculiar quirks and idiosyncrasies of the individual,’ and that patient’s ‘supposedly
inviolable right to decide for himself what is to be done with his body is made subject to a
standard set by others.” Id. at 761 n.30 (quoting McPherson v. Ellis, 287 S.E.2d 892, 897
(N.C. 1982)). However, the case has no “precedential impact” because subsequent to the
court’s decision, state legislation was passed “limiting the scope of informed consent . . . .”
Id. (citing Dixon v. Peters, 306 S.E.2d 477, 480 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)).
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decisional process, thus raising an obligation in the physician that
transcends arms-length transactions.75

Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted the reasonable
patient standard either by statute or case law.76
While the reasonable patient standard considers the perspective of the
patient, and is thus in some respects preferable over the professional
standard, the reasonable patient standard still fails to require or encourage
a physician to accommodate the health literacy of a particular patient when
obtaining informed consent. There may be room to argue that a prudent
physician would not depend on the consent form to achieve informed
consent without adequate discussion with the patient and accommodations
for the patient’s health literacy.
The legal doctrine of informed consent has been criticized as being
more committed to the rhetorical ideal of patient self-determination than “in
its provision of effective legal redress to victimized patients.”77 Realist critics
of informed consent argue that, in practice, informed consent “equals little
more than a legally worthless piece of paper with signatures obtained and
filed away in the medical record.”78 Alan Weisbard argued in 1986 that
[w]hile purporting to assure respect for individual self-determination, the
inaptly named law of informed consent has done little to ‘inform’ the unique
and sometimes idiosyncratic needs, concerns, and fears of individual
patients on whose ‘consent’ so much is said to rest. Indeed, one can
plausibly maintain that the legal doctrine has done more to teach physicians
how to practice medicine ‘defensively’ (so as to minimize legal liability) than
it has to foster physician-patient relationships that permit and encourage
patients to participate actively and knowledgeably in decisions concerning
their care.79

This criticism begs the question: where did this rhetoric of self-determination
originate?
B.

Ethical Perspectives of Informed Consent

Both the legal and ethical notions of informed consent feature language
of self-determination and autonomy, but despite having similar justifications
for informed consent they approach the means to obtaining informed
consent differently. There are many different ethical theories that can be

75. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972).
76. Studdert et al., supra note 67, at 105-06 & fig.1, 107-09 tbl.1 (stating that there are
twenty-five states, however figure 1 and table 1 indicate twenty-six states in 2002. Colorado
and Georgia are classified as having hybrid standards).
77. Weisbard, supra note 74, at 751.
78. Kapp, supra note 64, at 99 (internal citations omitted).
79. Weisbard, supra note 74, at 751.
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applied to the issue of informed consent, but autonomy-based theories
appear to be popular among those interested in the medical context.80
Generally it is accepted in both ethics and the law that the boundaries of the
duty to reveal are defined by the patient’s right to self-decision, or selfdetermination.81
Beauchamp and Childress’ ethical view of informed consent is often
cited.82 They discuss informed consent from the perspective of respect for
autonomy,83 and argue that “from the moral viewpoint, informed consent
has less to do with the liability of professionals as agents of disclosure and
more to do with the autonomous choices of patients and subjects.”84
Beauchamp and Childress break down informed consent into the following
elements: (1) “[c]ompetence (to understand and decide)[,]” (2)
“[v]oluntariness (in deciding)[,]” (3) “[d]isclosure (of material information)[,]”
(4) “[r]ecommendation (of a plan)[,]” (5) “[u]nderstanding” (of disclosure
and recommendation), (6) “[d]ecision (in favor of a plan)[,]” and (7)
“[a]uthorization (of the chosen plan)[.]”85 While courts narrowly focus on
disclosure and jurisdictions are split between the reasonable physician and
reasonable patient standards for disclosure, for Beauchamp and Childress
disclosure is merely one component of informed consent.86 The element of
understanding significantly identifies understanding of disclosure as
necessary for informed consent.87 A person understands “if they have
acquired pertinent information and have relevant beliefs about the nature
and consequences of their actions.”88 It is not necessary for understanding
to be complete; it suffices to have an understanding of the fundamental
facts.89 The element of understanding emphasizes that while disclosure is
an element of informed consent, disclosure to the patient without patient
understanding is not sufficient.90 If a patient cannot understand the
pertinent information of the disclosure due to low health literacy, then the
80. Most articles that are not written by ethicists seem to adopt autonomy as the default
ethical justification for informed consent. See, e.g., Jennifer Matiasek & Matthew K. Wynia,
Reconceptualizing the Informed Consent Process at Eight Innovative Hospitals, 34 JOINT
COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 127, 127 (2008) (noting that informed consent
derives from autonomy).
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 55, at 87-91.
83. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 60, at 117-120.
84. Id. at 121.
85. Id. at 120-21.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 120.
88. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 60, at 127.
89. Id.
90. See generally id. at 120-24 (noting that physicians may be guilty of negligent
disclosure, even if their action conforms to professional practice).
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element of understanding is not fulfilled, and informed consent is not
achieved. Thus, from the perspective of respect for patient autonomy, when
inadequate health literacy prevents patients from understanding disclosure
communications, informed consent has not been realized.91
Neil Manson and Onora O’Neill have criticized the popular autonomybased justification of informed consent.92 Instead of an autonomy-based
justification, they propose an approach to informed consent that views
informed consent as a waiver of epistemic and ethical norms, including
They argue that “[e]pistemically adequate
accuracy and honesty.93
communication is relevant communication, and has to be limited to what is
appropriate to the actual context.”94 The justification for informed consent
is that “it offers a standard and controllable way of setting aside obligations
and prohibitions for limited and specific purposes.”95 Informed consent
allows for the granting of permission for action that would “otherwise
constitute a breach of bodily integrity, personal liberty or privacy.”96
Standardized informed consent forms emphasize formalities and uniformity
while failing to provide adequate evidence that the underlying obligations
have been waived or that the transactions were epistemically sound.97
“Signatures, let alone ticks in boxes, may have legal weight, but they lack
ethical weight, and often do not provide evidentiary weight that genuinely
informed consent has been given.”98 Under this theory, genuine informed
consent is obtained when the relevant communication takes place and a
patient understands which obligations he or she is consenting to waive,
regardless of whether or not a standard informed consent form is signed.99
Communication is central to informed consent under the shared
decision making theory.100 Some commentators believe that informed
consent should be synonymous with shared decision making between
physician and patient; however, there is no agreement on how informed
91. See id. at 140 (discussing that patient demands are still unsettled).
92. NEIL C. MANSON & ONORA O’NEILL, RETHINKING INFORMED CONSENT IN BIOETHICS 94
(2007).
93. Id. at 94-95, 185.
94. Id. at 63.
95. Id. at 188.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. MANSON & O’NEILL, supra note 92, at 190-91.
98. Id. at 192.
99. See id. at 63, 95, 185, 188, 191-92 (noting that good communication between
patient and physician is imperative to informed consent).
100. See generally Simon N. Whitney et al., A Typology of Shared Decision Making,
Informed Consent, and Simple Consent, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 54, 54-56 (2004) (noting
that shared decision making involves the exchange of ideas and information between patient
and physician); Shalowitz & Wolf, supra note 13, at 759-60 (explaining that shared decision
making is improved by promoting joint communication between patient and physician).
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consent and shared decision making are related.101 Shared decision
making is closely aligned with the ethical autonomy based justification of
informed consent. There are three stages in the shared decision making
process: (1) “information exchange,” (2) “deliberation,” and (3)
“decision.”102 Under this theory, informed consent does not occur when a
consent form is signed, but rather when the patient and physician “discuss a
problem and choose an intervention together, a process that may take place
in [one] sitting or over the course of several encounters.”103 Within this
process low health literacy is an obstacle to the exchange of information
and, as a result, deliberation and decision making. Shared decision making
would require doctors to discuss information in a manner that permits
patients with low health literacy to understand the material information.
Shared decision making focuses on interpersonal communication in the
informed consent process as opposed to the mechanical signing of a
consent form.
Beauchamp and Childress, Manson and O’Neill, and shared decision
making represent three different ethical approaches to informed consent.
Health literacy is important for understanding disclosure under autonomybased informed consent, for understanding what underlying obligations are
being waived by consent within Manson and O’Neill’s framework, and for
information exchange and deliberation in the shared decision making
process. Consideration of health literacy is justified from multiple ethical
perspectives.
Health literacy is not currently an explicit factor that courts consider
when determining whether a patient gave informed consent to a medical
procedure or treatment.104 Courts narrowly focus on the physician duty of
disclosure while neglecting to investigate whether the patient understood the
disclosure given their health literacy level.105 Ethical theories consist of more
elements than mere disclosure for informed consent. Courts initially relied
on ethical justifications of autonomy for the doctrine of informed consent,
but they should now look to ethics for support for considering health literacy
in informed consent cases. The incorporation of health literacy into the
legal doctrine of informed consent can be accomplished through advocacy

101. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 60, at 117-20.
102. Shalowitz & Wolf, supra note 13, at 760.
103. Whitney et al., supra note 100, at 54 (internal citations omitted).
104. As of March 25, 2009, a document search for cases containing both “health literacy”
and “informed consent” produces no cases on both WestLaw and LexisNexis.
105. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 60, at 119-20, 121-22 (noting the legal
doctrine of informed consent is primarily based on a physician’s obligation to use reasonable
care to provide accurate information to the patient).
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around understanding of disclosure and disclosure of communications with
the help of ethical principles.
IV. HOW LITERACY AFFECTS CONSENT
Informed consent is contingent upon the general and health literacy of
the patient, i.e. the patient’s “ability to understand pertinent information.”106
In healthcare, under normal circumstances,107 patients are required to sign
informed consent forms prior to surgery, receiving blood products, or
participating in human subjects research.108 A quick examination of patients
with limited English proficiency demonstrates that healthcare organizations
recognize the importance of understanding the language of consent
communication. The case law surrounding this class of patients also
illustrates potential barriers to greater accommodations for health literacy,
including the readability of informed consent forms.
A.

Limited English Proficiency Patients

There are approximately eleven to twenty-one million Americans who
are not proficient in English.109 In other words, they have limited English
proficiency.110 A physician may be liable for failing to obtain a patient’s
consent to proceed with treatment if a limited English proficiency (LEP)
patient is not provided with interpreter services.111 Healthcare organizations
receiving federal funds (i.e., payments from Medicare and Medicaid) must
comply with civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination against anyone

106. Frank McClellan, Medical Malpractice Law, Morality and the Culture Wars: A Critical
Assessment of the Tort Reform Movement, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 33, 42 (2006).
107. As opposed to an emergency in which there is no time to get consent from the patient
or a family member. Or when a patient is not legally competent in which case a family
member is often asked to sign the consent form.
108. Michael K. Paasche-Orlow, The Challenges of Informed Consent for Low-Literate
Populations, in UNDERSTANDING HEALTH LITERACY: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICINE AND PUBLIC
HEALTH 119, 125 (Joanne G. Schwartzberg et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Paasche-Orlow, The
Challenges of Informed Consent].
109. Siddharth Khanijou, Comment, Rebalancing Healthcare Inequities: Language Service
Reimbursement May Ensure Meaningful Access to Care for LEP Patients, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 855, 856 (2005); see also Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 127-28 (noting there
are twenty-two million Americans with limited English proficiency).
110. See Khanijou, supra note 109, at 870 (discussing that a language barrier exists
between patients and physicians that results in communication difficulties); see also Matiasek
& Wynia, supra note 80, at 127-28 (discussing that English proficiency poses a barrier to
efficient healthcare communication).
111. Khanijou, supra note 109, at 870.
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seeking healthcare services.112 CMS recommends that medical institutions
provide patients with informed consent forms written in simple sentences in
the primary language of the patient.113 However, consent forms are
typically written in English,114 although some hospitals have begun using
translated consent forms.115 Although this is helpful for LEP patients who are
literate in their written native language, translated consent forms pose the
same barriers—they are difficult to read and understand—to low-literate LEP
patients as English forms do for patients with low health literacy. The CMS
recommendation that consent forms be written in simple sentences in the
primary language of the patient should be applied to forms in English as
well.
Even when the physician agrees that lack of understanding of the English
language would prevent a signed consent form from being valid, it may be
difficult to win an informed consent case, as evidenced by Rodriguez v. New
York City Health and Hospitals Corp.116 In this 2008 case a patient alleged
that, although she signed a consent form, the consent was invalid due to her
inability to read English.117 New York State, where the case was brought,
uses the professional standard for disclosure in informed consent cases.118
The court seemed to doubt the patient’s sincerity that she could not
understand the form because she did not ask to have a Spanish consent
form or interpreter provided.119 The patient had also acted as a translator
for another Spanish-speaking patient during her hospital stay.120 The
opinion does not discuss the extent to which she translated and the nature of
what she translated.121 She may have simply translated the symptoms that
the patient was experiencing. If that was the case, a person with low health
literacy would likely be able to orally explain symptoms in any language, but

112. PATIENTS AS PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 74; see Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at
132 (“Not providing adequate language assistance can . . . breach Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 . . . .”).
113. PATIENTS AS PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 75.
114. Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 129.
115. Id. at 132.
116. Rodriguez v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 50 A.D.3d 464, 466 (N.Y. App. Div.
2008).
117. Id. at 465.
118. See id. (noting, as part of informed consent, the plaintiff must prove “the defendant
physician failed to disclose the material risks, benefits, and alternatives to the contemplated
medical procedure which a reasonable medical practitioner under similar circumstances
would have disclosed, in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable
evaluation”).
119. Id. at 466.
120. Id.
121. See generally Rodriguez, 50 A.D.3d at 464-66 (no mention about the extent to which
plaintiff translated).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

396

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 2:379

may still have difficulty comprehending a standard consent form, risks, and
alternatives that use medical terminology. In this case the court was
reluctant to take the patient’s word for it that she did not understand the
form.122 The judicial reluctance to consider a patient’s comprehension of a
form written in her non-native language suggests that the courts will be
resistant to considering whether a native English speaker’s inadequate
health literacy prevented them from comprehending a consent form.
B.

Readability Level of Informed Consent Forms

The readability of informed consent forms is important because in most
states a signed consent form leads to a legal presumption that informed
Pre-printed informed consent forms are
consent was obtained.123
“commercially prepared and distributed.”124 These standard informed
consent forms lack a tailoring to the informational needs of a particular
patient based on that patient’s educational level and health literacy level.125
“There is growing reason for concern that consent forms are becoming
substitutes for, rather than documentary evidence of,” a conversation
between physician and patient that facilitates informed consent.126 If
informed consent forms are being used in the place of a conversation
between physicians and patients, it is crucial that patients are able to
understand the contents of the forms in order for them to make autonomous
or shared decisions, and arguably for the physician to satisfy his duty to
disclose.127

122. See id. at 466 (noting that there was insufficient evidence that plaintiff did not
comprehend what the defendant surgeon said or did).
123. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40(A)(1) (2008) (a patient signature marking
or affirmative action through electronic means of a consent form “shall be presumed to be
valid and effective, in the absence of proof that execution of the consent was induced by
misrepresentation of material facts.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1(b)(2) (2006) (rebuttable
presumption of valid consent); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103(4)(a) (West 2009) (signed written
consent raises a rebuttable presumption of valid informed consent); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2317.54 (West 2004) (“written consent . . . [is] presumed to be valid and effective, in the
absence of proof by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that the person executing the
consent was not able to communicate effectively in spoken and written English or any other
language in which the consent is written.”).
124. Weisbard, supra note 74, at 756.
125. Id. At most hospitals, after a patient has spoken with a physician and agreed on a
course of action, the patient is provided with an informed consent form to sign. “[B]ecause
the forms are presented only after a conversation during which actual understanding and
consent are presumably ensured, the consent forms themselves are sometimes presented to be
signed quickly, along with a number of other forms. As a result, patients rarely read, let alone
understand, the consent forms they sign.” Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 129.
126. Weisbard, supra note 74, at 756-57.
127. See supra Part III.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

PERSONALIZING INFORMED CONSENT

397

The average adult in the United States reads at an Eighth grade level,
but consent forms are often written at college or graduate school reading
levels.128 Informed consent forms utilize structured and technical language
that can result in confusion, poor understanding, and misinformed
consent.129 Fear of malpractice vulnerability has contributed to the
complexity of informed consent documents, for example, “the typical
informed consent document used for oncology randomized controlled trials
is five to eight pages long and is written at the grade 13 to 14 level.”130
After agreeing to or receiving care, at least sixty percent of patients “do
not read or understand the information contained in informed consent
forms.”131 It is doubtful that those patients are truly informed about the
decisions made.132 A study conducted by Mark Williams and his colleagues
found that 59.5% of patients at two urban public hospitals could not
“Patients unable to
understand a standard consent document.133
understand informed consent forms cannot intelligently participate in their
128. See Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 129 (stating that because consent forms are
intended to legally protect providers, “these forms often contain complex medicolegal terms
and are written at the college or even postgraduate [reading] level[s].”); PATIENTS AS PARTNERS,
supra note 17, at 78 (stating that the informed consent forms at several hospitals in the Iowa
Health System “were written at the 17th grade level or higher.”); Ad Hoc Comm., Health
Literacy, supra note 14, at 554 (noting that most consent forms are written “far above [an]
8th-grade reading level . . . .”).
129. IOM, supra note 28, at 187; see also Michael K. Paasche-Orlow et al., Readability
Standards for Informed-Consent Forms as Compared with Actual Readability, 348 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 721, 723 tbl.1 (2003) (The following are examples of informed consent language
describing “New Information about Risks” at different reading levels:
Fourth Grade

Sixth Grade

Eighth Grade
Tenth Grade

“We may learn about new things that might make you want to stop
being in the study. If this happens, you will be informed. You can
then decide if you want to continue to be in the study.”
“We may learn new things during the study that you may need to
know. We can also learn about things that might make you want to
stop participating in the study. If so, you will be notified about any
new information.”
“We will tell you about new information that may affect your
willingness to stay in this study.”
“We will tell you about new information that may affect your health,
welfare, or willingness to stay in this study.”

130. Williams et al., supra note 49, at 1681.
131. PATIENTS AS PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 73; Ad Hoc Comm., Health Literacy, supra
note 14, at 553.
132. PATIENTS AS PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 73; see Wilson, supra note 16, at 875
(explaining that literacy affects a patient’s ability to follow instructions given by his or her
physician).
133. Williams et al., supra note 49, at 1677-82.
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own care.”134 Given that approximately ninety million Americans have low
health literacy, it is likely that poor health literacy is contributing to patient
lack of understanding of information contained in informed consent
forms.135
Michael Paasche-Orlow and his colleagues reason that since nearly fifty
percent of adults read at or below an Eighth grade level, plain language
should be used for informed consent forms.136 They recommend that
informed consent forms be written at a Fourth grade to Sixth grade reading
level in order to convey risks simply and directly to low-literate patients.137
The National Quality Forum recommends that informed consent forms be
written at a Fifth grade reading level or lower and that they incorporate
pictures or symbols to enhance understanding.138 It has been suggested
that a patient’s low health literacy could invalidate a written informed
consent.139
Courts have been reluctant to look beyond the signature on an informed
consent form to determine if the patient understood the document.140 In
most states a signed consent form creates a legal presumption that the
patient’s informed consent was obtained, regardless of the readability level
of the form and the patient’s own health literacy level.141
V. INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE AND HEALTH LITERACY
Informed consent does not work as intended because “[d]octors
generally tell patients too little and patients generally understand too little for
patients to make the choices that lawmakers had imagined.”142 Also,
patients and providers have different views of when consent is necessary and
whether true informed consent was obtained.143 If informed consent is to
represent the autonomous decision of an individual patient, then
consideration of health literacy needs to be recognized within the legal
doctrine of informed consent. This Section explores the limited case law that
involves patient literacy and identifies ways in which those cases open the
way for arguments concerning health literacy.
Potential barriers to
134. Id. at 1681.
135. Schulte, supra note 20, at 18.
136. Paasche-Orlow et al., supra note 129, at 725.
137. Id.
138. PATIENTS AS PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 76.
139. McClellan, supra note 106, at 47.
140. See Rodriguez v. N.Y. City Health and Hosps. Corp., A.D.3d 464, 466 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008) (noting that “there was insufficient evidence that plaintiff did not understand the
discussions with defendant’s surgeon or other hospital staff.”).
141. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
142. Schneider, supra note 63, at 10.
143. IOM, supra note 28, at 189.
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advancing the importance of health literacy in the legal arena are discussed,
and opportunities for legal recognition of the importance of health literacy
are then proposed. This Section concludes with a review of initiatives to
improve the informed consent process for patients with limited health literacy
outside of the legal domain.
A.

Case Law Involving Signed Consent Forms and Patient Understanding

Currently, tort law does not specifically address the problem of patients
with limited general literacy and/or limited health literacy.144 Only a
handful of cases discuss both a patient’s literacy level and informed consent
forms as evidence of informed consent. The courts in Keomaka v.
Zakaib,145 Ditto v. McCurdy,146 and Hidding v. Williams147 considered
signed consent forms, literacy, and informed consent. An analysis of case
law illustrates some of the barriers and opportunities for advocating for
consideration of health literacy within the legal framework of informed
consent.
In Keomaka v. Zakaib, the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii held
that a physician does not fulfill his affirmative duty of disclosure “by merely
having the patient sign a printed informed consent form.”148 The court
identified the problem regarding consent forms, noting that
[t]here is a growing reason for concern that consent forms are becoming
substitutes for, rather than documentary evidence of, an ongoing process of
disclosure, discussion, and decisionmaking between physician and patient.
If physicians come to believe (often incorrectly) that their obligation to obtain
the patient’s informed consent can be satisfied by securing a signature—
even that of a drowsy, drugged, or confused patient on an abstruse, jargonridden, and largely unintelligible preprinted consent form—the law’s
reliance on written documentation may come to pervert its central purpose
in requiring informed consent.149

The patient in Keomaka had not read the consent form before signing it.150
However, the court reasoned that even if he had read the form, it did not
disclose the possible risks or alternative forms of treatment.151 The court
concluded that the patient had “neither the knowledge nor the duty” to ask
questions in order to receive the information that the doctor was required by
144. Id. at 184.
145. Keomaka v. Zakaib, 811 P.2d 478 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991).
146. Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 961 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997) aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
vacated in part, remanded, 947 P.2d 952 (Haw. 1997).
147. Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1991).
148. Keomaka, 811 P.2d at 486.
149. Id. at 486-87 (quoting Weisbard, supra note 74, at 756-57).
150. Id. at 487.
151. Id.
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law to disclose.152 Thus, the burden is on the physician to make sure that
the patient has the requisite understanding to give informed consent.
The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii held six years later in Ditto
v. McCurdy that a patient’s signature on a standard informed consent form
does not fulfill a physician’s affirmative duty of disclosure.153 In Ditto, the
patient had a fourth grade education, was a first generation Korean
immigrant, and could not read English when she signed the form.154 The
patient was fluent in spoken English, but not written English.155 The consent
form stated that the “‘physician has informed [the patient] of the . . . risks or
complications involved in [the] treatment or procedures . . . and alternative
forms of treatment, including nontreatment, available.’”156 Yet the patient
testified that the physician did not explain alternative procedures or possible
complications.157 It was clear at trial that the physician believed that
because the patient spoke English she would be able to read and
comprehend the consent form.158 At no point was the patient asked by the
physician or medical staff “whether she could actually read or understand
the consent form.”159
The court explained that the doctrine of informed consent is based upon
principles of individual autonomy, and that informed consent imposes an
affirmative duty on physicians and surgeons to “fully disclose to a patient
‘the type of risks and alternatives’ to a proposed treatment or surgery.”160 In
Hawaii, the doctrine of contributory negligence was replaced with a
modified comparative negligence statute.161 Therefore, the court reasoned
that a patient “‘is not contributorily negligent for failing to read a consent
form[.]’”.162 The court emphasized that it was a pre-printed informed
consent form.163 The Ditto court endorsed the reasoning of the Keomaka
court and added “‘[or uneducated]’” to the list of patient characteristics that
includes “‘drowsy, drugged, . . . confused,’” that would cause concern for
reliance solely on a signed consent form.164 The court thus signaled that
education affects a person’s ability to understand a consent form. A

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Ditto, 947 P.2d at 988.
Id. at 968, 987.
Id. at 969-70.
Id.
Id. at 987.
Ditto, 947 P.2d at 970, 987 n.27.
Id. at 970 (emphasis added).
Id. at 987 (quoting Keomaka v. Zakaib, 811 P.2d 478, 482 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991)).
Id. at 987 n.26.
Id. at 987.
Ditto, 947 P.2d at 987.
Id. at 988 (quoting Keomaka, 811 P.2d at 487).
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signature of a competent and literate adult is evidence to be considered
when determining whether a physician has satisfied his or her affirmative
duty, but “a signature, standing alone, cannot be equated with any alleged
comparative negligence on the part of the patient.”165 Thus, the patient has
no duty to speak up if he or she does not understand a pre-printed consent
form’s contents.166 It is the physician who has the burden to satisfy the duty
of disclosure.167
Though the Ditto court did not specifically address health literacy, it did
address illiteracy. It is unclear how the court’s ruling would be applied to a
case in which the informed consent form was not pre-printed. The court
may have purposefully added “uneducated” to the reasoning used in
Keomaka to question the usefulness of having a signed consent form as
proof of informed consent.
Health literacy is related to education and should be added to the list of
reasons that securing a signature on a consent form is not conclusive
evidence that genuine informed consent has been given. The Ditto court
emphasized in its reasoning that the form was “‘abstruse, jargon-ridden,
and largely unintelligible,’”168 suggesting that it was full of technical and
complex language, and likely written at a high reading level.
In
comparison, a pre-printed form that uses plain English and is written at a
Fourth to Eighth grade reading level with a patient signature might be
weighted as strong evidence of true informed consent by a court in this
jurisdiction for patients who have low general and/or health literacy. This
reasoning should be adopted by courts in other jurisdictions because it
weighs patient education—and by association literacy—as a factor and
encourages physicians to ensure that patients understand the risks and can
therefore make true informed consent.
In Hidding v. Williams, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found
that “[i]n order for a reasonable patient to have awareness of a risk he
should be told in lay language the nature and severity of the risk and the
likelihood of its occurrence.”169 The patient in Hidding had a Sixth grade
education and “minimal” reading skills.170 The patient’s wife would
accompany him to his appointments so that she could help him understand
the doctor’s orders and instructions.171 A consent form was signed by the

165. Id. at 988.
166. See id. (explaining that when patients do not completely understand the consent form,
the physician has a duty to help them understand).
167. Id.
168. Ditto, 947 P.2d at 988 (quoting Keomaka, 811 P.2d at 487).
169. Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1196 (5th Cir. 1991).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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patient, but according to his wife, he would not have been able to
understand the document on his own.172 The generic consent form
identified one risk of treatment as “‘loss of function of body organs’”, but
the wife interpreted the phrase to mean “‘you can’t get up and walk around
or that when you do, you may stumble or fall or be very weak or wobbly on
your feet.’”173
According to the Hidding court, the doctrine of informed consent is
based on the principle that every competent adult has the right to determine
what is done to his or her own body.174 “A doctor is required to provide his
patient with sufficient information to permit the patient himself to make an
informed and intelligent decision on whether to submit to a proposed course
of treatment.”175 The court adopted the Second Restatement of Torts, which
states that in order to “establish consent to a risk it must be shown both that
the patient was aware of the risk and that he agreed to encounter it.”176 A
Louisiana state statute requires that patients be “afforded the opportunity to
ask questions and must acknowledge in writing his consent to the
treatment.”177 According to the statute, a patient is presumed to have
understood and consented when the form is signed.178
The Hidding court stated that a bland statement as to a risk, such as
“‘loss of function of body organs,’” when not accompanied by an estimate
of its frequency, is inadequate.179 The court found that Mrs. Hidding
“successfully rebutted the presumption attached to the signed consent
form.”180 The physician has a duty “to disclose material risks in such terms
as a reasonable doctor would believe a reasonable patient would
understand.”181 The Hidding court’s ruling suggests that a consent form is
evidence of informed consent, but is not conclusive.182
These cases are significant because they addressed the legal
presumption of valid informed consent when an informed consent form was
signed by a patient with limited literacy skills. If courts are willing to
recognize the importance of education and the duty of the physician to
ensure patients understand material information, then courts may be

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1194.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1196 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1979)).
177. Id. at 1195.
178. Id.
179. Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1196.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. IOM, supra note 28, at 190-91 (discussing Hidding to illustrate the potential issues
that must be considered when examining literacy and informed consent).
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persuaded that limited health literacy and the readability level of consent
forms are valid reasons to overcome the presumption that a signed form
means valid informed consent was obtained.
B.

Potential Barriers and Obstacles

It has been over a decade since Keomaka,183 Ditto,184 and Hidding185
were decided and health literacy has yet to be discussed in the context of the
validity of signed consent forms. In many states if a patient signs an
informed consent form they are presumed to have understood and
consented to the risks.186 It will be difficult to overcome that presumption.
As of the writing of this Comment, there are no published cases that address
low health literacy as a possible factor that can overcome the presumption
of understanding when an informed consent form is signed.
The reasonable physician standard for disclosure provides little
opportunity to argue that consent was not sufficiently informed based on an
individual patient’s health literacy because it is based on the objective
reasonable physician. The Hidding court stated that disclosure must be in
“such terms as a reasonable doctor would believe a reasonable patient
would understand.”187 With that rule, advocacy is necessary around the
definitions of “reasonable doctor” and “reasonable patient.” As discussed
supra, nearly half of adults in the United States have limited literacy skills,
and it is likely that many more have low health literacy.188 Does a
“reasonable doctor” consider that their patients may have limited reading
skills? It might be fair to presume that a “reasonable patient” cannot
understand medical jargon and the complex wording of standard informed
consent forms. Under the reasonable physician/professional standard of
disclosure, the best argument for consideration of health literacy may be
that it is unreasonable for physicians to rely on pre-printed consent forms
written at reading levels well above the average American’s reading ability
to obtain patients’ informed consent.
A barrier to taking literacy into account is that physicians have difficulty
recognizing when patients have low health literacy, because patients with
low literacy are adept at hiding it from their physicians.189 Further, the
183. Keomaka v. Zakaib, 811 P.2d 478 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991).
184. Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 961 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997).
185. Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1192.
186. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. However, “[u]nder the common law,
consent did not need to be written, and written consent did not provide airtight insulation
against liability.” Weisbard, supra note 74, at 757 n.17.
187. Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1196.
188. See discussion of literacy supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
189. See Shalowitz & Wolf, supra note 13, at 760 (noting physicians sometimes are unable
to judge how much lower literate patients understand); Marcus, supra note 16, at 339
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majority of functionally illiterate adults “are able to sign their own names
without difficulty.”190 The 2003 NAAL classified signing a form as one of
the simplest, concrete literacy skills that a patient with Below Basic health
literacy skills can do.191 A physician (and a court) may see the patient’s
signature and mistakenly assume that the patient was able to read and
comprehend the text of the consent form.192 Thus, physicians are likely to
overestimate a patient’s understanding of written materials.193 Currently, it
appears that many doctors assume that a patient understands an informed
consent form, taking away that assumption will mean that healthcare
providers will need to spend more time with patients. The time necessary for
a physician to ensure a patient understands the risks and is consenting
would vary upon the patient’s health literacy and the communication skills
and tools of the physician. One solution is to allow physicians to bill for the
consent process.194 If this type of financial incentive were used, the consent
process should be clearly defined in order to incorporate appropriate
consideration of patient health literacy.
Many hospital lawyers, risk managers, and consultants are skeptical that
simplified consent forms (which are easier to read for patients with low
health literacy) will suffice to meet regulatory, accreditation, and state
requirements for valid consent because they lack the legal jargon and
medical terminology typical of standard informed consent forms.195 This
skepticism stands in the way of a shift towards informed consent forms
written in plain English. It does appear that JCAHO and CMS would find
simplified consent forms satisfactory based on their current guidelines, but
simplified forms may not satisfy individual state informed consent laws.196
State informed consent statutes that do not clearly permit simplified or plain
English consent forms are a barrier to accommodation for health literacy in
the informed consent process because of the fear that using them will open
the doors to more, not less, liability.197
(discussing how one patient’s reading problem was unknown to nurses, social workers, and
physicians).
190. Paashe-Orlow, The Challenges of Informed Consent, supra note 108, at 126.
191. WHITE, supra note 19, at 33 tbl.4.
192. See generally Paashe-Orlow, The Challenges of Informed Consent, supra note 108,
at 125-26 (explaining some may mistakenly apply attributes from other signed documents to
informed consent forms).
193. Shalowitz & Wolf, supra note 13, at 760.
194. Paashe-Orlow, The Challenges of Informed Consent, supra note 108, at 133; see
also Akira Akabayashi & Michael D. Fetters, Paying for Informed Consent, 26 J. MED. ETHICS
212, 212 (2000) (explaining that Japan allows physicians to bill the Ministry of Health and
Welfare for the consent process).
195. Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 135.
196. Id. at 131-32.
197. But see discussion on current initiatives infra notes 215-34 and accompanying text.
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C. Opportunities for Consideration of Health Literacy
While patients with low health literacy are capable of consenting, they
need to understand the informed consent information in order to provide
genuine informed consent. In the words of the Pennsylvania Superior Court,
“[the] information must give the patient ‘a true understanding.’”198
The elements of disclosure and understanding of disclosure and
recommendation are both recognized by Beauchamp and Childress as
ethically necessary for informed consent.199 If a physician does not have a
verbal discussion with his or her patient regarding the risks and alternatives
of treatment, but instead relies on a complex consent form filled with
medical jargon (a college reading level), then it can be argued that under
the reasonable patient standard of disclosure, the physician has failed. If a
patient cannot understand the consent form—whether because of the
language in which it is written, the reading level of the form, or the medical
jargon used—then he or she cannot truly exercise his or her right to selfdetermination. This does not mean that all forms need to be written at a
lower grade level. Physicians can use the teach-back/relate-back method
and/or explain the form in plain English to the patient to enhance
understanding and overcome the shortcomings of the form.200 This
argument is supported by the the Supreme Court of Kansas, which held in
Natanson v. Kline that a physician has an obligation “to disclose and
explain to the patient in language as simple as necessary.”201
It is important to remember that informed consent is supposed to be
supported by physician-patient communication and discussion, not by the
consent form itself. The absence of written consent does not necessarily
mean that there was no consent. In Yahn v. Folse, the patient was
functionally illiterate and hard of hearing, and prior to surgery no written
consent was obtained.202 Dr. Folse believed that he had received oral
consent when the patient said “‘[o]kay.’”203 On rehearing, the court found
that Dr. Folse had obtained informed consent.204 Dr. Folse sat close to the
patient and used a loud voice because he was informed that the patient was
hard of hearing.205 Further, the physician spent fifteen to twenty minutes
with the patient prior to the procedure, which the court found was enough

198. Isaac v. Jameson Mem’l Hosp., 932 A.2d 924, 929 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
199. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 60, at 117-18.
200. See discussion of the teach-back and relate-back methods infra notes 224-31 and
accompanying text.
201. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106-07 (Kan. 1960).
202. Yahn v. Folse, 639 So. 2d 261, 264 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 270.
205. Id.
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time and opportunity for questions. This case illustrates that informed
consent does not legally require a signed consent form—absent a state
statute requiring one—and that a physician can accommodate patients who
are illiterate and hard of hearing. By having the material risks explained
verbally, the patient did not have to try to read a consent form. This case
could be used to placate physician fears that simplified consent forms will
not hold up in court because, absent a state statute, written consent is not
required. If a simplified consent form is used as a tool to help the consent
communication process. As suggested in Yahn v. Folse, it is that
communication that validates the informed consent, not the form itself.
In response to the concern that consent forms written at lower reading
levels will not be legally sufficient, state legislation can explicitly make those
consent forms valid. Ideally, state legislation would endorse plain English
consent forms and explicitly state that a signed consent form is insufficient if
a discussion between the physician and patient about the relevant risks and
alternatives did not take place.
Quintanilla v. Dunkelman, emphasizes how the existence of informed
consent is fact- sensitive.206 In Quintanilla the physician argued that a
signed consent form is conclusive evidence of informed consent, and that to
hold otherwise would allow plaintiffs to deny having read and understood
consent forms in order to sue physicians.207 The physician contended that
this would lead to more lawsuits and have a negative impact on the practice
of medicine.208 The court disagreed and stated that the existence of
informed consent is “‘a peculiarly fact-bound assessment which juries are
especially well-suited to make.’”209 Each patient presents a separate unique
problem; the patient’s mental and emotional conditions, as well as other
individual circumstances, are important to whether informed consent was
obtained.210 Thus, the court held that “the validity of written consent” is “a
question of fact for the jury to decide based upon conflicting evidence.”211
Whether a person has sufficient health literacy to comprehend a written
consent form should also be a question of fact for the jury to decide.
In states that have a reasonable patient standard for disclosure, health
literacy can be incorporated by advocating that the reasonable person is an
individual with a similar health literacy level as the patient at issue.
Advocacy should focus on making this standard more subjective. Another
argument is that the reasonable patient should be defined based upon

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Quintanilla v. Dunkelman, 133 Cal. App. 4th 95, 115 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Arato v. Avedon, 5 Cal.4th 1172, 1186 (1993)).
Id.
Quintanilla, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 118.
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statistical data of health literacy in the United States or the particular patient
population.
One way of alleviating the difficulty of obtaining genuine informed
consent from patients with low health literacy would be to legislatively
mandate that all medical informed consent forms be written in plain English,
without medical jargon. “Federal securities laws require that certain
documents geared toward investors conform to the ‘plain English’ rule,
requiring that documents be written on a sixth or seventh grade reading
level, in the active voice, and with no double negatives.”212 Jillanne Schulte
suggests that it would be reasonable for the law to mandate a plain English
rule for informed consent forms because “[t]he financial information
contained in Securities and Exchange Commission documents is as
complex, dense, and sophisticated as any information found in the medical
field.”213
D. Current Initiatives to Improve the Consent Process
As discussed supra, evidence suggests that many standard informed
consent forms are written at a readability level well above the Eighth grade
reading level of the average adult in the United States.214 While within the
legal arena there has been little recognition of the problems posed to the
informed consent doctrine by inadequate health literacy among patients, the
following are methods that have been undertaken to improve the
communications with patients prior to their giving informed consent outside
of the legal domain: simplified forms with plain language and simple
illustrations, drawing analogies,215 audiotapes, videotapes, and multimedia
resources.216 This Section describes some of the initiatives that have tried to
improve either the readability of consent forms or the disclosure
communication process.
JCAHO “requires medical instructions to be given on a level
understandable to patients.”217 According to JCAHO, an organization must
obtain and document informed consent in accordance with the
organization’s policy.218 Further, an organization’s policy must include a
discussion of risks, benefits, side effects, alternatives, and likelihood of
achieving goals.219 Some states have statutes that describe alternative

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Schulte, supra note 20, at 18.
Id.
See discussion on the readability level of informed consent forms, supra Part IV.B.
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 60, at 128.
Williams et al., supra note 49, at 1681-82.
Lee et al., supra note 52, at 1317.
Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 131.
Id.
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means of disclosure that may be used in the informed consent process.220
CMS guidelines on informed consent forms state that they must include a
statement that the treatment, benefits, risks, and alternative therapies were
explained.221 The JCAHO and CMS guidelines were “intended to address
common concerns about the legality of simplifying consent forms[,]” but it is
important to note that both guidelines “defer to state law” when state
statutes require more detailed consent forms.222 Non-uniform state law
requirements may make a simplified consent form legally valid in one state
and insufficient in another.223
Some innovative hospitals have initiatives “to create a more unified
informed consent process, in which consent forms are used to structure a
conversation, teach, and ensure patient understanding, as well as for
documentation and legal protection.”224 One such practice involves
incorporating systematic redundancies into the informed consent process, or
the repeat-back method.225 This method is used to make sure that informed
consent is more than just the signing of a form—it simultaneously allows
patients the opportunity to ask questions and helps physicians and nurses
confirm patient understanding.226 Another method is to incorporate repeatback into the consent form, by requiring physicians and/or nurses to check a

220. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1(c) (2006) (stating the information that must be
disclosed to obtain consent “may be disclosed through the use of video tapes, audio tapes,
pamphlets, booklets, or other means of communication or through conversations with” listed
medical personnel). While the statute lists numerous communication tools, it does not list
informed consent forms. Id. Consent forms presumably fall under “other means of
communication.” Id.
221. Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 132. By stating that the risks, benefits, and
alternatives to a given treatment must be explained, and not that they must be explicitly
listed/described, the door is opened for simplified consent forms.
222. Id.
223. See id. at 135-36 (noting that legislatures should address the lack of uniform
guidelines on informed consent at the state level).
224. Id. at 129. For example, one hospital in the study, conducted by the American
Medical Association’s Ethical Force Program and the American Hospital Association’s Health
Research and Educational Trust, revised some of its consent forms in collaboration with
external liability consultants and hospital staff (including interpreters and translators). Id. at
131 sidebar.1. The hospital also incorporated the repeat-back method. Id. Another hospital
lowered the reading level of its surgical consent form from the Sixteenth grade level to the
Seventh to Eighth grade level. Id. The form now includes a large space for the staff member
to write out in the patient’s own words their description of the procedure (another form of
repeat- or teach-back method). Id. The form does not list the risks or benefits, but asks
patients to affirm that they were reviewed with them. Id. Patients have found the new forms
more clear and straightforward, and the nursing staff prefers them because they are easier to
read and review with patients. Id.
225. Id. at 133.
226. Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 133.
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box confirming that a patient was able to correctly repeat back the purpose
of the procedure, the main risk, and the potential benefit.227 Studies have
shown that the repeat back method does improve patient comprehension
and recollection of healthcare information.228 The AHRQ, the Leapfrog
Group, and the National Quality Forum have all recommended the repeat
back method for informed consent.229
Similarly, a strategy that focuses on physician-patient communication
and patient understanding is the teach-back method, which is used prior to
obtaining a patient’s signature for consent. With the teach-back method,
the physician explains the risks to the patient and then asks the patient to
repeat the information in their own words so that the physician can gauge
whether they understood what was conveyed.230 Computer-based programs
that teach patients about conditions and treatment options, test patient
understanding, and document informed consent are also being used by
some hospitals and health systems.231
Videotapes can also be used as a tool to communicate the information
needed for informed consent to patients. In Winkle v. Tullos, the patient was
shown a videotape that explained the procedure and discussed the risks
prior to surgery, and she signed a disclosure and consent form that satisfied
the state statute requirements.232 The court found that the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury’s failure to find lack of informed consent.233
Thus, as long as a consent form complies with state legislation, a videotape
appears to be a valid substitution for a physician-patient discussion of the
risks.234 Videotapes could be an efficient way to improve informed consent
for patients with limited health literacy—assuming that the video’s dialogue
is in plain English and not filled with medical jargon— without consuming
more of the physician’s valuable time.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A major flaw in the current legal doctrine of informed consent is that it
assumes that patients can read and understand the information on informed
consent forms, and thus does not adequately consider patient health

227. Id. at 134.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. PATIENTS AS PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 72 sidebar 4.2.
231. Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 134. There is some concern that overreliance
on computer-based programs will discourage physician-patient informed consent discussions.
Id.
232. Winkle v. Tullos, 917 S.W.2d 304, 315 (Tex. App. 1995).
233. Id.
234. Id.
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literacy.235 Inadequate health literacy is a pervasive problem in the United
States, affects a wide variety of people, and is not easily recognized by
physicians.236 The legal doctrine of informed consent emphasizes the
importance of disclosure, while ethics supports the importance of
understanding and communication in the consent process, an aspect that is
currently overlooked in the legal system. The legal presumption that
informed consent was obtained if a patient signed an informed consent form
does not encourage genuine informed consent. Informed consent forms are
often written far above the reading level of an average patient.237 Policies
and practices should be more closely aligned with the ethical requirements
of informed consent: understanding and communication.238
Consideration of health literacy in informed consent is important
because a patient’s literacy level can greatly impact their ability to
understand the contents of a consent form and/or discussion with a
healthcare provider. Without comprehending the consent information, a
patient is denied their right to make informed, autonomous decisions about
their healthcare. The law has done little to encourage the ethical
justifications and legal rhetoric behind informed consent: patient selfdetermination and autonomy.239 “The physician who punctiliously recites
the litany of potential risks and secures the patient’s signature on the proper
form, but who fails even to attempt to engage the patient as a person in the
decisionmaking process at more than this superficial level, may well be
legally protected.”240 A consent form that says that the patient’s signature
means that they have read and understood the form is irrelevant if they
cannot even read that line.
As pointed out by Paasche-Orlow, the complexity of pre-printed
informed consent forms is evidence that the focus of the form “is not patient
education but an attempt to avoid professional liability.”241 When seeking
the informed consent of patients with low health literacy, complex and
technical consent forms should increase, not decrease, professional liability,

235. See PATIENTS AS PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 73 (noting the entire system of informed
consent is built on the assumption that a patient can read and understand informed consent
forms).
236. See discussion of literacy, supra Part II.
237. See discussion of the readability level of informed consent forms, supra Part IV.B.
238. See, e.g., Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 129 (noting that in a study of how
eight hospitals “use patient-centered communication to improve health care”, “[l]eaders and
staff at each hospital expressed a strong desire to improve the informed consent process and
align it with ethical standards . . . .”).
239. See supra Part III.
240. Weisbard, supra note 74, at 757.
241. Paasche-Orlow, The Challenges of Informed Consent, supra note 108, at 126.
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if additional measures are not taken by the provider to ensure that the
patient understands and consents—more than just receiving a signed form.
Opening the floodgates for more informed consent litigation against
physicians is not the goal of this Comment. This Comment simply seeks to
highlight that genuine informed consent cannot be achieved by reliance on
consent forms that patients with limited health literacy cannot understand. If
a form is not too lengthy, has a good layout, a readable text size, and uses
plain language, then the signature of a patient with low health literacy, but
not those who are completely illiterate, would be stronger evidence of
informed consent. Utilization of accommodations for literacy, that is,
simpler language in consent forms and enhanced communications
processes, such as the teach-back or repeat-back methods, should free
physicians of liability for obtaining informed consent. Such methods should
be encouraged by state law so that the physician’s own motivation to be free
from liability is aligned with the goal of informed consent: enabling patients
to understand and make autonomous decisions about their healthcare.
Another approach to ensure that health literacy is adequately considered
in informed consent is to advocate for state legislatures to adopt the
reasonable patient standard of disclosure. For states that have adopted the
reasonable patient standard, advocacy should revolve around defining a
reasonable patient as one who has low health literacy, or using a more
subjective standard. An additional avenue for advocacy would be to
propose or support state legislation that declares that a mere signature on a
consent form is not enough to satisfy genuine informed consent.
Currently, the legal duty of informed consent is significantly different
than the ethical theories of informed consent. Instead of encouraging
discussion, understanding, and patient autonomy, the doctrine of informed
consent emphasizes the formality of obtaining a patient’s signature. If
informed consent is to represent a patient’s knowing and understanding of
risks, then health literacy must be considered as well. An appropriate
consideration of health literacy can be achieved by either extending current
theories through advocacy around the definitions of “reasonable physician”
and “reasonable patient,” or through legislation.
If informed consent forms are intended to serve as educational
documents to facilitate the decision making process, then they should be
treated as such.242 Physicians should no longer be permitted to avoid
liability by procuring a signature on a consent form without having disclosed
the risks and alternatives to patients with different health literacy levels in a
manner that enables patients to understand to what they are consenting. At
the very least, courts should consider the readability level of consent forms

242. Id. at 131-32.
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before courts presume that they are representative of a patient’s informed
consent. As patients take on more personal responsibility for their
healthcare with the rise in popularity of CDHC, it is becoming increasingly
important that the law recognize physicians’ duties to obtain genuine
informed consent.
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